By invitation of one of the contributors to Theology for Dummies, I was privileged to participate in a fascinating discussion pertaining to the care of persons in a Permanent Vegetative State (PVS). The discussion centered on the moral obligations incumbent upon Christians toward those in a PVS. One person defended his belief that a person in a PVS has come to the end of his divinely appointed purpose and, therefore, to prolong his life by providing food and water was not a necessary moral obligation. As this person explained it, man’s appointed purpose is intimately related to his soul’s ability to cognitively relate with God. Consequently, when—in a PVS—the body is unable to function properly and supply the human soul with sensate input which can be used to form rational thoughts, the ability of the person to willfully relate with God ceases. Hence, to unduly prolong the life of a person in a PVS is not a moral obligation and—in come cases—may be improper.
The arguments are certainly more subtle than I have described here; however, I’ve done my best to keep things short and easy to grasp.
The argument against sustaining the life of a person in a PVS is based upon the Christian belief that man has a rational and immortal soul. Though this belief is grounded in Scripture, theologians like Thomas Aquinas thoroughly developed our understanding of the human soul in order to deal with false notions and teachings that opposed the Christian view. Therefore, I will offer a few thoughts here from Aquinas that counter the belief that Christians do not have a moral obligation to sustain the life of a person in a PVS.
Christians believe that man is a composite being made of both a soul and a body. However, Christians also believe that man’s soul continues to exist after death (defined as the separation of the body and soul). The question, though, is what—if any—functions of the soul continue after the death of the human body? Aquinas held that certain operations of the human soul are not inherently connected directly to the body (including the brain); therefore, those operations could continue after death. Now, we need to be careful here. Aquinas would caution us that these operations—though capable of existing separate from the body—are still reliant upon the body. Here is how he states this:
“Indeed, although the soul, while united to the body, enjoys an absolute being not depending on the body, nevertheless the body is the soul’s housing, so to speak, and the subject that receives it. This explains why the soul’s proper operation, understanding, has its object, namely, the phantasm (we would call this “sense data”), in the body, despite the fact that this operation does not depend on the body as trough it were effected through the instrumentality of a bodily organ. It follows that, so long as the soul is in the body, it cannot perform that act without a phantasm; neither can it remember except through the powers of cogitation and memory, by which the phantasms (sense data) are prepared…” (SCG II, Ch. 80, A. 12.)
In summary, Aquinas is saying that though the human soul can exist apart from the body after death, it is still dependent upon the body to be able to function properly. This is why he notes that after death (and before the Resurrection) Christians will receive from God an “abundant influx” of “perfect understanding.” He means by this that God will supply to the souls of Christians what their bodies would have supplied (sense data and information)—only better.
Aquinas makes the point that the principle underlying the “abundant influx” of “perfect understanding” is that when a “soul is freed from preoccupation with its body,” the human soul “is more fit” to understand “higher things.” He notes that people who temperately control their bodily passions are better suited for understanding the things of God. This is just good commonsense and clearly taught in Scripture. This, then, is why a disembodied soul will be able to better understand the “higher things.”
Interestingly, Aquinas also notes that certain people who are in a “fainting condition or in ecstasy”--which are states of withdrawal from the body--are able to comprehend things beyond the scope of human reason (Paul’s spiritual experience in 2 Cor 12). He also notes that people sometimes receive powerful insights from “higher beings” when they are sleeping (Peter in Acts 10). Therefore, I believe Aquinas would not allow us to use his theory of the human soul to justify refusing care to someone in a PVS. I believe he would say that such a person may actually be better equipped to receive “higher things” precisely because their bodies are not functioning at full capacity.
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I mean, if there were a God, wouldn't it have been proven by now? and end these arguments? Reality and the human mind are really a bloody pain in the ass. If we could only do away with them, we'd understand everything perfectly. frankie
So, the very real question is "How much care?"
Perhaps then Aquinas sees that reviving such a person to their putrid state of poverty and physical disability might abligate us to have mercy on him and indeed through whatever mercy we use, kill him.
I don't hear you suggesting a moral obligation to bring such a person to full health where possible.
Bridled by Aquinas, and knowing that he saw Eve as a failed effort at an equal to Adam, I don't think he would think we have such a moral obligation.
"So, that fellow who must of been taken by thieves, motionless and bleeding by the side, fortunately for us not blocking our way, his dream state brings him closer to God. The man is blessed. Let's not disturb him...." says the philosopher. And with a blessing for him sent to Heaven we stir, over time, just enough dust from the path to eventually suffocate him." God's will be done, right?
I don't hear you suggesting a moral obligation to bring such a person to full health where possible.
●As is so often the case, Gecko, you don’t seem to grasp the essential meaning of the post. What is under question is a person in a “Permanent Vegetative State.” The terms of the thought-question assume that the person cannot recover from the physical disability and can only be comforted until he dies. This is what the word “permanent” means. Perhaps a course in remedial reading would help.
Human rights was not His strong suit.
●Again, it is a thought-question which posits that the hypothetical patient will never recover. It is not a “real” person. The thought-question allows those discussing the issue to focus on the germane issue. In this case the issue pertains to the state of the rational soul in a PVS which will not be recovered from.
You wrote: Your remark runs parallel to the logic of Aquinas concerning women. The fact that they are women, their malady is permanent...he would say. Stay in the kitchen, avoid the despair and failure of education.
●Perhaps you missed the point of the post.
You wrote: Human rights was not His strong suit.
●How would you know this?
http://www.aquinasonline.com/Questions/women.html
●The first responsibility of fair-minded scholarship is to do one’s due-diligence and provide an accurate picture of those arguments that one opposes. Those employed in higher education usually demonstrate this.
The question I have is when exactly is the soul freed from preoccupation with its body if the body still lives? Injury to the body other than the brain would not free the soul. If the soul is unconnected to the functions of the brain, why would an injury to this organ be different?
If the soul remains in a body with an injured brain, where then is the line drawn? A person could be in a PVS due to brain injury but still breathing own their own or a person could be so traumatized that a they are put on a respirator for breathing. The heart still beats on its own in these cases. Some brain injuries are so bad that there is no longer discernible brain activity, yet the heart beats and they breath. Generally, we accept harvesting these folks organs. What of the soul then? Is there a distinction between these in Aquinas' formulation?
I would guess that at some point, the soul is trapped in a body where there is such little actual functioning left and, by man's act, the "perfect influx" is delayed. If the soul is trapped in a non-functioning body (without brain function- no dreams or other sub-conscious functioning other than a beating heart), it would seem that correspondence of any kind is terminated and the soul isolated and prevented temporarily from its purpose.
These are more questions than comments.
I have never heard of Permanent Vegetative State - I have heard of Persistant Vegitative State -
I don't think there is a doctor alive who would declare someone as 'permanent'. To declare someone to be in a "'permanent' vegetative state" requires some form of divine insight to which I don't know one human to be capable of.
Of course, there are come docs who are called by many people 'god' - and its because they behave life like they are one.
To say one is in a 'permanent' vegetative state is also to suggest that God or science cannot turn the condition around.
ron
What's so complicated about understanding that body and soul are two entities, although relevant one to the other in the case you describe? Most Christians believe in helping others - not killing others when the body fails to function well.
Synonym(s): Persistent Vegetative State
What is Coma and Persistent Vegetative State?
A coma is a profound or deep state of unconsciousness. An individual in a state of coma is alive but unable to move or respond to his or her environment. Coma may occur as a complication of an underlying illness, or as a result of injuries, such as head trauma. A persistent vegetative state (commonly, but incorrectly, referred to as "brain-death") sometimes follows a coma. Individuals in such a state have lost their thinking abilities and awareness of their surroundings, but retain non-cognitive function and normal sleep patterns. Even though those in a persistent vegetative state lose their higher brain functions, other key functions such as breathing and circulation remain relatively intact. Spontaneous movements may occur, and the eyes may open in response to external stimuli. They may even occasionally grimace, cry, or laugh. Although individuals in a persistent vegetative state may appear somewhat normal, they do not speak and they are unable to respond to commands.
Is there any treatment?
Once an individual is out of immediate danger, the medical care team focuses on preventing infections and maintaining a healthy physical state. This will often include preventing pneumonia and bedsores and providing balanced nutrition. Physical therapy may also be used to prevent contractures (permanent muscular contractions) and deformities of the bones, joints, and muscles that would limit recovery for those who emerge from coma.
What is the prognosis?
The outcome for coma and persistent vegetative state depends on the cause, severity, and site of neurological damage. Individuals may emerge from coma with a combination of physical, intellectual, and psychological difficulties that need special attention. Recovery usually occurs gradually, with some acquiring more and more ability to respond. Some individuals never progress beyond very basic responses, but many recover full awareness. Individuals recovering from coma require close medical supervision. A coma rarely lasts more than 2 to 4 weeks. Some patients may regain a degree of awareness after persistent vegetative state. Others may remain in that state for years or even decades. The most common cause of death for someone in a persistent vegetative state is infection, such as pneumonia.
Citation: http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/coma/coma.htm (copied 3-10-08)
Persistent Vegetative State (PVS)
A vegetative state can be defined as "a clinical condition of unawareness of self and environment in which the patient breathes spontaneously, has a stable circulation, and shows cycles of eye closure and opening which may simulate sleep and waking" [Working Group of Royal College Physicians, "The Permanent Vegetative State," The Journal of the Royal College of Physicians 430 (1996): 119-21]. Since patients in such a state sometimes show behavior that could be interpreted as evidence of consciousness, the diagnosis is not always self-evident. Additionally, the condition of being in a vegetative state is similar to that of other conditions that involve the absence or partial absence of awareness of self and the environment, such as coma, locked-in syndrome and akinetic mutism. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS (MSTF) has recommended the use of seven clinical criteria in making the diagnosis. It also has been suggested that these criteria be reviewed through neurologic examinations repeatedly. According to the MSTF and the American Neurological Association, the vegetative state has to have endured for at least one month in order for it to be considered persistent [The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, "Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State," New England Journal of Medicine 330 (1994): 1572-79; ANA Committee on Ethical Affairs, "Persistent Vegetative State: Report of the American Neurological Association Committee on Ethical Affairs," Annals of Neurology 33 (1993): 386-90]. Some clinicians make a distinction between a persistent vegetative state and a permanent vegetative state based on the duration of the vegetative state, but there is little difference in the prognosis and the ethical considerations remain very similar, if not identical. [Gastone, CG, "Persistent Vegetative State: Clinical and Ethical Issues," Theoretical Medicine 18 (1997): 221-36.]
Citation: http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/issues/persistent.asp
(copied 3-10-08)
My post here was my attempt to show that the person in a PVS may just be in greater communication with God than we realize. This attacks the “purpose” argument and shows that even the individual’s purpose is not at an end simply because their body does not fully function.
By Richard M. Doerflinger
On Christmas Eve, 1999, the family of Patricia White Bull in Albuquerque, New Mexico received an unexpected gift. After 16 years in a supposedly irreversible "vegetative state," Mrs. White Bull began to speak.
"Don't do that," she blurted out when nurses were trying to fix her nursing home bed. Then she started speaking her children's names, catching up on family developments, and eating foods she had not been able to swallow for many years. Her mother says her sudden recovery is a Christmas miracle from God (The Washington Times, January 5, 2000, p. A3).
Mrs. White Bull's story is not unique. In recent years, a number of patients have unexpectedly recovered from the "vegetative" state - a dimly understood condition in which patients have sleep/wake cycles, but do not seem aware of themselves or their environment. And according to medical experts speaking at a March 2004 international congress on the "vegetative state" in Rome, medical science is only beginning to realize how little is understood about this condition.
The term "persistent vegetative state" was coined in 1972. Physicians said then that patients with this diagnosis had no consciousness or sensation, and could not recover once they had remained in this state for a certain number of months. The latest findings contradict all this. It turns out that patients diagnosed as being in a "vegetative" state may have significant brain waves, and substantial parts of the upper brain may be alive and functioning. This functioning may even change depending on whether a friend or relative is speaking nearby. The testimony of many families that their loved ones in this state seem to know when they are present can no longer be dismissed as simply wishful thinking. And medical experts are no longer so confident that they can name a number of months or years in this state that makes some degree of recovery impossible.
On March 20, 2004, near the end of the Rome conference on the "vegetative" state, Pope John Paul II delivered an important speech in an audience with the attendees. This speech clarified
and reaffirmed our moral obligation to provide normal care to these patients, including the food and fluids they need to survive. Here the Holy Father made several points:
No living human being ever descends to the status of a "vegetable" or an animal. "Even our brothers and sisters who find themselves in the clinical condition of a 'vegetative state' retain their human dignity in all its fullness," he said. "The loving gaze of God the Father continues to fall upon them, acknowledging them as his sons and daughters, especially in need of help." Against a "quality of life" ethic that makes discriminatory judgments about the worthiness of different people's lives, the Church insists that "the value of a man's life cannot be made subordinate to any judgment of its quality expressed by other men."
Because this life has inherent dignity, regardless of its visible "quality," it calls out to us for the normal care owed to all helpless patients. In principle, food and fluids (even if medically assisted, as in tube feeding) are part of that normal care. Such feeding, he said, is "a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act." This means, among other things, that the key question here is simply whether food and fluids effectively provide nourishment and preserve life, not whether they can reverse the patient's illness. Even incurable patients have a right to basic care.
This judgment does not change when the "vegetative" state is diagnosed as "persistent" or unlikely to change: "The evaluation of probabilities, founded on waning hopes for recovery when the vegetative state is prolonged beyond a year, cannot ethically justify the cessation or interruption of minimal care for the patient, including nutrition and hydration."
Deliberate withdrawal of food and fluids to produce a premature death can be a form of euthanasia, that is, unjust killing. "Death by starvation or dehydration is, in fact, the only possible outcome as a result of their withdrawal. In this sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and willingly, true and proper euthanasia by omission."
The Church's traditional teaching, that one is not obliged to impose useless or excessively burdensome treatments on patients, remains valid. The obligation to provide assisted feeding lasts only as long as such feeding meets its goals of providing nourishment and alleviating suffering. But to those who might too easily withdraw such feeding as overly burdensome, the Holy Father warns that "it is not possible to rule out a priori that the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, as reported by authoritative studies, is the source of considerable suffering for the sick person." If a seemingly unresponsive patient might be able to feel the burdens of tube feeding, he or she may also be able to feel the suffering of being dehydrated to death.
We must not forget the needs of families caring for a loved one in a "vegetative" state. The rest of us must not abandon these families, but reach out to give them every possible assistance so they will not face their burdens alone. Respite care, financial support, the sympathetic cooperation of medical professionals and volunteers, and psychological and spiritual comfort were among the kinds of help the Holy Father urges society to provide.
The Pope's speech responds to a serious moral and legal problem that has divided families, ethical advisors, and courts in the United States and elsewhere. For many years, "right-to-die" groups have promoted the withdrawal of assisted feeding from patients in a "vegetative" state. Sometimes they have admitted that they see such patients as better off dead (or at least see their families as better off if the patients are dead). Ethicist Daniel Callahan warned in the Hastings Center Report in October 1983 that many of his colleagues favored such policies not because of special burdens involved in such feeding, but because "a denial of nutrition may in the long run become the only effective way to make certain that a large number of biologically tenacious patients actually die." In some of the "tube feeding" court cases that have divided families and sparked headlines, even some family members have declared that the patient is essentially already dead - an "empty shell" with no human dignity.
Church officials have warned against this trend in the past. In 1992, for example, the U.S. bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities issued a resource paper titled "Nutrition and
Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections," recommending a strong presumption in favor of assisted feeding for patients diagnosed as being in the "persistent vegetative state." The paper strongly opposed any removal of these means designed to hasten the patient's death from dehydration or starvation. It also found that assisted feeding is generally not "extraordinary means" - rather it is usually an effective way to sustain life that does not impose grave burdens on patients. Similarly, a 1995 "Charter for Health Care Workers" issued by the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health Care Workers stated: "The administration of food and liquids, even artificially, is part of the normal treatment always due to the patient when this is not burdensome for him: their undue suspension could be real and properly so-called euthanasia."
By reaffirming these principles, the Holy Father is reminding us that here, as on issues such as abortion, embryo research and capital punishment, the Church's voice must be raised to insist that every human being is a beloved child of God, that no one is worthless or beyond our loving concern. This does not mean that patients must accept tube feeding in cases where they would see it as an unwarranted intrusion that only increases their suffering. When discussing the burdens and benefits of medical procedures, the Church has always recognized that these judgments have a subjective element, and that patients' own assessments are to be given great weight. In the final analysis, as Pope Pius XII said in a 1952 address to the medical community, "the doctor has no other rights or power over the patient than those which the latter gives him."
At the same time, the obligation to respect human life in every condition is addressed to all of us, including patients. Catholics should beware of "advance directives" that reject assisted feeding across the board; rather, we should seek out more carefully worded documents that recognize the presumption in favor of such care when it does not impose undue burdens on the patient. Many state Catholic conferences have produced statements on this issue, or even sample forms allowing Catholics to specify their wishes in ways that reflect Catholic values and conform to any requirements of state law. Forms allowing the patient to name a trusted proxy decision maker, to made decisions when the patient can no longer do so, may be more helpful than a written declaration that tries to anticipate all future medical situations.
Hospitals and physicians, for their part, should not be obliged to comply with a request from patient or family that they believe is immoral. The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services state that a Catholic hospital "will not honor an advance directive that is contrary to Catholic teaching," and adds: "If the advance directive conflicts with Catholic teaching, an explanation should be provided as to why the directive cannot be honored" (Directive 24).
When would such a directive conflict with Catholic teaching? When it ignores the general obligation to support and care for human life, and treats a condition like the "vegetative" state, in and of itself, as a basis for withdrawing even the most basic measures for preserving the patient's life and comfort. In an extreme case, it may be obvious that the document is rejecting assisted feeding simply to ensure that the patient in such a condition dies as soon as possible.
Patients and families, like others involved in medical decisions, need to understand that while specific medical procedures may at times become useless or burdensome, this can never be said of human persons themselves. Caring for loved ones who may never be able to respond or thank us for our faithfulness could be the ultimate test of our commitment to a culture of life.
Richard M. Doerflinger is Deputy Director of the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.
Source: http://www.usccb.org/prolife/programs/rlp/04doerflinger.shtml (
Copied 3-10-08)
Today it is very important to protect, at the moment of death, both the dignity of the human person and the Christian concept of life, against a technological attitude that threatens to become an abuse. Thus some people speak of a "right to die," which is an expression that does not mean the right to procure death either by one's own hand or by means of someone else, as one pleases, but rather the right to die peacefully with human and Christian dignity. From this point of view, the use of therapeutic means can sometimes pose problems.
In numerous cases, the complexity of the situation can be such as to cause doubts about the way ethical principles should be applied. In the final analysis, it pertains to the conscience either of the sick person, or of those qualified to speak in the sick person's name, or of the doctors, to decide, in the light of moral obligations and of the various aspects of the case.
Everyone has the duty to care for his or he own health or to seek such care from others. Those whose task it is to care for the sick must do so conscientiously and administer the remedies that seem necessary or useful.
However, is it necessary in all circumstances to have recourse to all possible remedies?
In the past, moralists replied that one is never obliged to use "extraordinary" means. This reply, which as a principle still holds good, is perhaps less clear today, by reason of the imprecision of the term and the rapid progress made in the treatment of sickness. Thus some people prefer to speak of "proportionate" and "disproportionate" means. In any case, it will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means by studying the type of treatment to be used, its degree of complexity or risk, its cost and the possibilities of using it, and comparing these elements with the result that can be expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and his or her physical and moral resources.
In order to facilitate the application of these general principles, the following clarifications can be added:
If there are no other sufficient remedies, it is permitted, with the patient's consent, to have recourse to the means provided by the most advanced medical techniques, even if these means are still at the experimental stage and are not without a certain risk. By accepting them, the patient can even show generosity in the service of humanity.
It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to interrupt these means, where the results fall short of expectations. But for such a decision to be made, account will have to be taken of the reasonable wishes of the patient and the patient's family, as also of the advice of the doctors who are specially competent in the matter. The latter may in particular judge that the investment in instruments and personnel is disproportionate to the results foreseen; they may also judge that the techniques applied impose on the patient strain or suffering out of proportion with the benefits which he or she may gain from such techniques.
It is also permissible to make do with the normal means that medicine can offer. Therefore one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which is already in use but which carries a risk or is burdensome. Such a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it should be considered as an acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure disproportionate to the results that can be expected, or a desire not to impose excessive expense on the family or the community.
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted. In such circumstances the doctor has no reason to reproach himself with failing to help the person in danger.
Citation: Declaration on Euthanasia, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
May 5, 1980
Now regarding PVS and such. I think that Thom has done an excellent job of showing how we should preserve life even in this situation using the proper application of Thomistic theology instead of pulling out small pieces of his theology to support euthanasia. Granted, Tom could have gone about supporting the preservation of life in a great number of other ways including an appeal to compassion like Gecko would have liked to see of course, and certainly that should be considered under another train of thought, but it isn't really relevant to the discussion as Thom laid it out.
I do think that the practical thing would be to make a living will though. I think that if I was in a vegetative state that I was unlikely to recover from I would rather my friends and family gather around me and pray then pull the plug so to speak. My biggest concern would be putting my wife and children in an impossible financial situation. Through prayer I believe I could be healed, and if God chooses to take me then I will be with Him. Thats my opinion of how my own life should be handled in this situation.
I hope you have some life insurance (buy term - it is better value)
ron
●At its essence, the argument of the antagonist described in my post was a Thomistic-based “quality of life” argument. This is why I examined the interrelationship between the soul and the body in states of ecstasy and sleep.
●By the way, these are excellent citations—very helpful.
Puri wrote: Granted, Tom could have gone about supporting the preservation of life in a great number of other ways including an appeal to compassion like Gecko would have liked to see of course, and certainly that should be considered under another train of thought, but it isn't really relevant to the discussion as Thom laid it out.
●Thanks, Puri, you described the gist of my post perfectly.
●To my knowledge, Aquinas only examines the fully functioning human, the infant, the human in states of ecstasy and sleep, and the disembodied soul. Of course, he later considers the soul as reunited to the body through the resurrection—both of the righteous and unrighteous.
You wrote: I would guess that at some point, the soul is trapped in a body where there is such little actual functioning left and, by man's act, the "perfect influx" is delayed. If the soul is trapped in a non-functioning body (without brain function- no dreams or other sub-conscious functioning other than a beating heart), it would seem that correspondence of any kind is terminated and the soul isolated and prevented temporarily from its purpose.
●What you are describing is essentially what the antagonist of my post was positing. I offered my counter argument to this in a comment to Peter on my last post. I maintained that each of God’s creatures have an individual (or particular) purpose and a universal purpose. Though a creature’s individual purpose seems to be defective or come to an end, its universal purpose falls into a higher order of providence. For instance, the sudden tragic death of a child seems fruitless at the individual level; however, at a higher order of purpose, much good can come from such a tragedy. In short, the purpose of a man is not simply as an individual. Men, like all of God’s creation, are part of His universal purpose to draw all things into His goodness.
I wish I had your persistent ability to hope for the best in other people's intent. Of course Thom had never heard of a "Permanent Vegetative State" either - he has heard of Persistant Vegetative State. You know by choice of worship that Orthodoxy are bounding in politics, interfering in the pure pleasure of the gospel.
Thom has been quite clear to my mind at least that too much money is extracted from his wallet in support of such useless care.
Here he is pressing politically speaking a point of view that destroys the foundation of All that Christ taught about compassion for others.
Please do not think that the world of Christians glad handing him think differently that he thinks.
While he points at the "secular" the slight of hand works for most.
I don't think there is a doctor alive who would declare someone as 'permanent'. To declare someone to be in a "'permanent' vegetative state" requires some form of divine insight to which I don't know one human to be capable of.
I do have life, but I need to get an additional policy. Before we moved I had almost 2xs what I have now.
Of course, what is better than the life is the health. I don't get paid well at all for what I do, but the church does give me health insurance which I haven't had in 4 years now. I'm almost looking forward to seeing the Dr. for a wellness checkup.
I doubt there is any confusion. It is easier to attack Christianity by making up a totally falicious argument.
I don't think we have to leave our families wealthy, but I think good stewardship means we at least help them be debt-free and some reserves.
ron
by no means would doubling my current coverage leave my family wealthy. I figure it would pay off debt, burial expenses, a potential medical expenses up to our max annual out of pocket, and then about 2 year income.
I figure 2 years income will allow my wife some time to greive then time to find a job that will pay the bills. If she is careful with the money and the medical bills are low enough she might be able to pay for a 2 year degree so that she can get a little bit better job than she currently qualifies for.
If I didn't have a persistent belief in people's best intent, I would be a complete failure as a counselor.
Whatever people are doing, even their destructive lifestyles, is their best attempt at the moment to deal with life. I want to be a man of grace - since so much grace has been extended to me.
ron
sounds like a plan - and if she can start on her education sooner - the better.
ron
●The problem, of course, it that your view is “quite clear” only in your mind. For the rest of us, it is quite clear that my post: A) opposes the position that it is morally acceptable to pull the plug on a person in a PVS; B) that the post is not about the medical specifics of a PVS; and C) it is about how man’s soul continues to have a purpose even in a PVS.
●My experience tells me that it is "quite clear" when you begin your typical ad hominem attacks on my character that you have nothing intelligent to add to the conversation.
I was confused last Thursday. I thought I heard Edmund and some others say that Aquinas was not a substance dualist. Was that said?
In any event, I think that Aquinas is clearly a substance dualist, such that we can't really be certain that what we can observe in a person's brain actually corresponds to what is happening in their mind.
The great bulk of philosophers of the mind - and neurologists - are vehemently opposed to dualism of any kind. John Searles - who is in a small minority of philosophers of the mind for arguing in favor of free will - is often derided as a kind of dualist in the grip of religion in his old age, and he vehemently denies being religious.
A couple other points:
Edmund's argument is really only the secular argument dressed up in religious clothes. The secular argument is that a person in PVS can't enjoy life and therefore should be starved to put them out of their misery (which is ultimately self-contradictory since a person who can't experience anything can't be miserable.) This view assumes that the "purpose" of human existence is to be happy and since a person can't achieve that end, their life is essentially over.
Edmund takes the same basic insight and puts it into the language of the Catechism which says that the purpose of life is to "know, love and obey" God. (Actually, it says to seek to know love and obey God, which is a big difference in this discussion.)
I think Thom's argument about a person having a general and a specific purpose in life is a good counter to the argument insofar as it recognizes that "purpose" is equivocal; there are a lot of purposes in existence, and one's individual purpose is only one of them.
My response, however, is that "purpose" really has nothing to do with how we treat other human beings; we treat other human beings with at least a minimal level of care because they are part of our family and we are required to be charitable to those who are part of our family.
The secular argument is that a person is a human being because they function as a human being; once they lose that function, then they are no longer human and do not have the moral claim to support and protection as the rest of us human beings have. This is the argument that is often made in favor of abortion; fetuses can't function as humans and therefore their moral claims are non-existent or substantially less than that of the women in whose body they are being carried around (i.e., their mothers.)
That is a very nice modern way of looking at things. Moderns are all about the quantifiable and the measurable.
On the other hand, we might say that one's moral claims on other is historical. We have the moral claims we do because we belong to the same family and get our rights and claims on others from the same source. So, the important criteria is not what we can do, but who we are, namely we are human because we are born of human parents.
In that case, the question is whether a person in a PVS is part of the human moral community, or do we read them out of the community simply by virtue of the accident of their disability - something without moral weight if membership in the human community is a birthright?
I think the latter position is far more consistent with Christian ethics. I daresay that it is more consistent with the Bible which is always talking about family, community, being the adoptive sons of God, the prodigal son, etc., etc.
And, then, that ties into Thom's point about particular and general purposes. People in PVS are not the only ones who have to worry about being read out of the human community by virtue of their reduced function; the elderly, the disabled, the mentally ill and babies, for that matter, may all - in someone's view - live a life that doesn't rise to the functioning status of 'human'. As Alisdair MacIntyre points out in his book on "Dependent Rational Animals", all human beings at one or more points in their lives are "disabled."
Providing those in PVS with food and water, therefore puts a "hedge around the community" which tells those in a less disabled state that they remain part of the community. It also helps society form the virtues of acknowledge dependence and gratitude that allows for society to funciton as a community.
And, Gecko, Thom never said "pull the plug."
You should apologize for that slander.
Substance dualism is a type of dualism most famously defended by Descartes, which states that there are two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material. According to his philosophy, which is specifically called Cartesian dualism, the mental does not have extension in space, and the material cannot think. However, some substance dualists, such as Thomas Aquinas and William Hasker, reject this and many other ideas associated with Cartesian dualism.
●The Wikipedia article does not explain why or in what way Aquinas rejects Cartesian dualism. However, there is a very fine article by JP Moreland and Stan Wallace titled, “Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics” which can be found here:
http://afterall.net/papers/490580
●In part the article states the following:
Aquinas' emphasis on the one individual substance produced by the union of form and matter differs significantly from Cartesian dualism. Put briefly, Cartesian dualism views a human as a being composed of two ontologically distinct substances—a spiritual substance (the soul now taken to be the mind) and a physical substance (the body). Moreover, the mind alone constitutes the essence of the individual and the body in no way partakes of this essence. Descartes states: "For in my opinion nothing without which a thing can still exist is comprised in its essence, and although mind belongs to the essence of man, to be united to a human body is in the proper sense no part of the essence of mind."
On the other hand, Thomistic dualism logically excludes the possibility of the body existing qua human body without a soul informing it. Thus, any notion of a human being composed of two individual substances is rejected. Aquinas writes: "We must not think, therefore, of the soul and body as though the body had its own form making it a body, to which a soul is super-added, making it a living body; but rather that the body gets its being and its life from the soul."
●In simplified lingo I think we might say that Aquinas was a dualist in the sense of believing in form and matter; but, he believed that the human person was one substance as a composite of soul and body.
●I made an earlier comment on Timbo’s statement here, but I now realize that Aquinas might take exception with how this argument is framed. Perhaps the idea of a soul “trapped” in a non-functioning body fits better with Cartesian Substance Dualism. I think Aquinas might stress that the person is actually the body/soul composite; therefore, the individual is suffering from a defect that is accidental to his personhood. The PVS person is no less a human.
That is a very interesting point about the connection between Cartesian dualism and our sympathy for those in PVS. We seem to unconsciously think of the "ghost in the machine" and feel that somehow the person is trapped within his flesh, which gives rise to feelings of claustrophobia and being buried alive.
I'm not sure what the idiom is for the Thomistic perspective, however....a badly operating computer, one where it takes forever for Windows Vista to boot. If we take the Thomistic perspective, how do we think of those in PVS?
I'm still trying to draw a bead on Cartesianism versus Thomism. Thomas affirms that the soul is "subsistent", namely that it is its own substance:
I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.
ST I, 75.
Yet, the soul is not something apart from the body, as you point out. Is the human a composiste/blended entity composed of both soul and "meat" in some kind of "hypostatic union"? Clearly, the soul can exist apart from the "meat" because the soul is immortal, and the meat can exist apart from the body, because we know there are such things as corpses.
But the peson is the "meat" and soul together.
So, one way of putting the answer to my question about idiom is to say that a person in PVS is someone with defective "meat" and perfect soul, such that it would be as immoral to put that person on an ice-flow as it would be to put someone with perfect meat and a defective soul. Ultimately, they are all humans.
Or something like that.
This statement from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ , would seem to disagree with your formulation. It suggests that Aquinas' believed that the soul is a substance and the body is a substance but that a person requires the uniting of the substance that is soul with the substance that is body.
"The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle's system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint — other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person — one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us', but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us'. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)
First, my comment that is referred to here was really a series of questions as I stated in the post. Most of the questions were answered by Ron's subsequent post. It wasn't my intent to argue Descartes in this context. If you look at the post, I was trying to distinguish PVS from more dire circumstances like "brain death" where there is no possibility of recovery. This is "trapped" context. This isn't the hypothetical situation that was posed.
Having apparently stumbled on it, I decided to look into Cartesian Substance Dualism. I am no expert but will post things that appear relevant. At the outset, it doesn't appear obvious to me that a cartesian would say that a PVS person is less human. On the contrary, if the soul/mind exists independent of the body, the fact that a PVS person essentially lives without an obvious connection to sensory input has no impact on the existence of the soul/mind.
Given this, my sense is that a cartesian would not seek to terminate a person in a PVS.
Also, it can be argued that Descartes did not ignore the union of mind and body:
"In effect, Cartesian dualism claims the independent existence of a non-corporeal realm and a physical realm. But, at the same time, through his works, whenever Descartes presents the distinction between thought and matter, he mentions the tight relation in the human beings between mind and body. This can be found in the Rules [AT X 415; CSM I 42], it is clearly stated in the Treatise on Man [AT XI 119-120; CSM I 99], and is fully developed in the Meditations.
In the Sixth Meditation, we can see that Descartes comes to the conclusion that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing, and immediately after affirms that he certainly has a body that is very closely joined to me [AT IX 62; CSM II 54].
In this passage the union is initially mentioned as a possibility, but right away, to anticipate says Descartes, it is stated with certainty. Here, Descartes tells us about the fact of the union, but he does not give any further explanations. Anyway, these are not necessary, because what follows in his argument is that, despite this union, there is no obstacle to affirm that ... I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. Then, he finally concludes the argument saying that it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it [AT IX 62; CSM II 54].
Dualism and union are present in the same argument, but while the former is the main topic and Descartes center of attention, the latter is only mentioned as a fact." http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mode/ModeMonr.htm
See http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/dualism.html The dictionary of Philosophy of Mind where I found this under dualism:
"There has been a recent revival of interest in the topic of Cartesian dualism amongst modern philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. Arguments against dualism have been provided on the basis of both empirical evidence and on philosophical grounds, and clearly express the predominant view (Dennett, Damasio, Churchland). However, a number of modern philosophers of mind, though in the minority, have come to the defense of dualism (e.g. Hart). The question of dualism is not only of historical interest, it also has important implications for the scientific enterprise. If a convincing rejection of dualism can be formulated, the classic mind-body problem will be solved by its becoming a non-problem and the materialist approach of modern science will be vindicated (or, more accurately, some form of monism (materialism being the most plausible) will be vindicated). If, conversely, dualism can be convincingly maintained, it is by no means obvious that empirical evidence will suffice for a thorough understanding of the mind -- in other words, understanding the brain may not be enough for understanding the mind."
We know of Daniel Dennett, who debated Dinesh D'Souza (available on you-tube)
The point of view that our Christian obligation to our fellow men is limited short of discoveries by man, which apparently we provided ourself without an assist by God, fails. But this is nontheless your position. The moral standards of so many of the unchurched exceeds what you describe for the Christian.
John, How then in giving do you differentiate yourself from your nonChristian neighbors or even your Moslem enemies who give humbly from their substance knowing a deeper obligation?
Biblically speaking, it should be quite apparent to you that the ongoing response of God may already be known and felt. I caution here knowing your position is accepted in a much broader sense in your "Christendom".
It is amazing that with the discussion here and the obvious possibility for learning and growth, your contribution consists in displaying how badly you can misunderstand (the charitable possibility) John's comment.
The statement you quoted hinges on the word "obligatory". Your response to his uncomplicated comment is unintelligible. Is it your position that we are morally obligated to provide extraordinary means to prolong life in every situation? If so, what is your position on organ donation? I suppose this is immoral from what little I can surmise from your rant.
When I wrote "My thinking...", I was intentionally distinguishing my own musings from any official position of my Church, which has wisely chosen to establish general principles over many specific applications. Since you apparently take exception to where I had thought the line might be drawn calling into question my Christian values, perhaps you would like to define your own line? I'm attempting to balance the sanctity of life with my firm trust in God beyond the inevitable outcome of our deaths. Are you obligated to use any available technology to preserve life no matter how expensive? Should your family be obligated to bankruptcy to pay for your medical care in such a circumstance or do you think that "society" should pick up the tab (along with every one else's)? If not, where do you draw the line or think God draws the line and why?
Peter and John: the Catholic News Agency is stating the following:
A Vatican official has listed a set of “social sins” to draw attention to sinful acts that have social ramifications in an interview with the Vatican daily L’Osservatore Romano… "While sin used to concern mostly the individual, today it has mainly a social resonance, due to the phenomenon of globalization," said Bishop Girotti.
“You offend God not only by stealing, taking the Lord's name in vain or coveting your neighbor's wife, but also by wrecking the environment, carrying out morally debatable experiments that manipulate DNA or harm embryos,” said Bishop Girotti, according to L’Osservatore.
The bishop classified as social sins drug abuse, "morally dubious" experiments such as embryonic stem cell research, polluting the environment, excessive wealth, contributing to income inequality, and creating poverty.
●The article goes on to list the “seven social sins” as:
1. "Bioethical” violations such as birth control
2. "Morally dubious" experiments such as stem cell research
3. Drug abuse
4. Polluting the environment
5. Contributing to widening divide between rich and poor
6. Excessive wealth
7. Creating poverty
●If “creating poverty” and “contributing to widening divide between rich and poor” are now considered sins, then all Marxists, socialists and “progressive” Democrats are clearly and obviously outrageous sinners.
●Talk about opening Pandora’s Box! Wow! It is amazing to me how many clergy have virtually no idea what causes poverty or what creates wealth.
●Talk about opening Pandora’s Box! Wow! It is amazing to me how many clergy have virtually no idea what causes poverty or what creates wealth.
Please describe the assumptions that lead to this conclusion. The connection may not be obvious to all of us.
Muslims are not my enemies, but my brothers. You often claim brotherhood, but apparently you don't really embrace it. I don't differentiate charity, for charity is the heart of God. Any man that has charity has the life of God in him. I was not trying to grade levels of charity, but to explore the boundary that defines the sin of omission, i.e. charity that should be, but is not.
It seems to me God has made us stewards of His goods. The bishop is talking about failure to be a good steward in amassing wealth for self in flagrant disregard for the needs of others.
That "news story" is an example of the media IQ falling on religious subjects.
CWN explains:
When a second-tier Vatican official gives a newspaper interview, he is not proclaiming new Church doctrines. Archbishop Girotti was obviously trying to offer a new, provocative perspective on some enduring truths. The effort backfired-- but in a very revealing way.
An ordinary reader, basing his opinion only on the inane Telegraph coverage, might conclude that a "sin," in the Catholic understanding, is nothing more than a violation of rules set down by a group of men in Rome. If these rules are entirely arbitrary, then Vatican officials can change them at will; some sins will cease to exist and other "new sins" will replace them. But that notion of sin is ludicrous.
Sin is an objective wrong: a violation of God's law. What is sinful today will be sinful tomorrow, and a deadly sin will remain deadly, whether or not Telegraph editors recognize the moral danger. The traditional list of deadly sins remains intact; nothing has replaced it. Greed, gluttony, and lust are as wrong today as they were a day or a year or a century ago. If Archbishop Girotti referred to "new" sins, it is because some of the offenses he named (such as genetic manipulation) were impossible in the past, and others (such as international drug trafficking) are much more prevalent today, in a global society. Insofar as people could have engaged in these activities a century ago, they would have been sinful then as well.
A sin is not a sin because simply an archbishop proclaims it so. Sin, the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches us, "is an offense against reason, truth, and right conscience…" The precepts of "reason, truth, and right conscience" do not shift in response to political trends, nor do they change at the whim of Vatican officials.
The fundamental point of the L'Osservatore Romano interview was that Catholics need to recover a sense of sin, make use of the sacrament of Confession, and receive absolution for their offenses. Sin, the archbishop insisted, is a reality that man cannot escape.
I think the Archbishop has a nice idea, but it's kind of abstract. If I'm pouring toxic waste into a river without regard for nature or my fellow man, then I hope it's a sin, but I'm not sure how pertinent that concern is to most individuals.
I think the Archbishop's basic point is that our moral concerns have to keep up with technological changes.
As for the Democrats, when you listen to Edwards and others playing up class warfare language, I can't help but think that stirring up social discord and envy are close to - if not within - the deadly sins of wrath and envy.
In being personally unintelligible to you, perhaps you should take a moment with John. He appeared to follow it just fine.
Remember, it is you who condemned any greater responsibility than what would be naturally provided by God. It seems you can articulate all manner of "Christian" war doctrine - its justification - and every Christian's responsibility in upholding it.
Perhpas some other Christian here can provide an answer to my question.
Excuse me? You're accusing me of a strawman, then launch off into some tangent on Christian war justification?
Let's stick to the topic. If you think you've got a better line in the sand, then lay it on the table and explain why. How far do you think you are obligated to go in sustaining your own life or that of another? As Timbo noted, where is it, are you obligated to organ donation or even blood donation? emptying your life's savings and selling your property? You must live in la la land if you think lives can't be ruined by medical bills. I suspect you really don't have an answer, but just want to act self righteous and sling mud.
"Every seeker of eternal life should be thoroughly aware of the fact that Jesus Christ, the great Judge, declared that the criteria that will be followed in separating the righteous from the wicked at the judgment day will be the treatment which each of us has given to the poor. To quote his words:
When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory:
And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats:
And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left.
Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world:
For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in:
Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me.
Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink?
When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? Or naked, and clothed thee?
Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee?
And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.
Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels:
For I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink:
I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not.
Then shall they also answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee?
Then shall he answer them, saying, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to me.
And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal."
Does this help you in understanding your obligation as a Christian?
There was no tangent into Christian war justification. It certainly isn't an interest of mine.
No strawman? Please demonstrate how taking the above scriptures to heart will create backruptcy, where with faith He says we will only be blessed.
The Christian war justification comment was yours, not mine. If it wasn't a tangent and you have no interest, why'd you make it?
Apparently you too are rather minimalist from the Biblical quote you supplied. Jesus only mentions visiting the sick, not providing treatment or technical intervention of any kind. If that's your position, where's your beef?
No.
Can you answer my earlier questions now or are you not done yet taking issue with John for som