When it is said that "nothing greater can be conceived", the fact is that as finite beings our conception has finite limitations. We cannot entirely grasp and resolve the concept of the infinite. When we conceive of a triangle, it is because it has a finite existence of which we have experience. If one can't really fully conceive the infinite, how can one say that it has a real existence, much less one's limited conception of the infinite in his imagination? It seems to me Anselm's argument boils down to the assumption that something must actually exist for us to have a conception of it. This would be like saying that I can imagine myself winning the lottery......so far I haven't yet been able to cash the check.

●Actually, both of your objections to Anselm were first leveled by Gaunilo. Regarding the first objection, Anselm did not believe it was necessary to be able to conceive of infinite existence in order to agree to the stipulations of his argument. He was well aware that a finite mind cannot grasp the infinite. Specifically, he counters Gaunilo’s objection that there is nothing sufficiently like God for us to be able to form an idea of God. He argues the following:

For since every lesser good, insofar as it is good, is similar to greater good, it is clear to every reasonable mind that by raising our thoughts from lesser goods to greater goods, we can certainly form an idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of those things than which a greater can be thought. Who, for example, is unable to think…that if something that has a beginning and end is good, then something that has a beginning but never ceases to exist is much better? And that just as the latter is better than the former, so something that has neither beginning nor end is better still…So, there is in fact a way to form an idea of that then which a greater cannot be thought.

●The second objection would, I believe, be handled by Anselm by saying that he was well aware that simply having an idea in my mind (i.e. winning the lottery) does not make it so. He would counter by noting that the conception of a being “that than which no greater can be conceived” is a special case and one has to have a “robust” (Prof. Williams’ term) understanding of the terms in order to see how denying the possibility of its existence is self-contradictory. He was claiming that if you’re thinking of that than which nothing greater can be thought as not existing, you haven’t yet managed to think of that than which nothing greater can be thought—because anything that is truly “that than which nothing greater can be thought” is greater than something that is capable of not existing. Put another way, it is impossible to conceive of an eternal being that doesn’t exist that must begin to exist. These are contradictory notions.

●Well…it had been established for a 1,000+ years as part of the Western intellectual and philosophical tradition that some things have greater goodness than others. Of course, relativists and monists deny this; however, Anselm was arguing from within the Western intellectual tradition which was highly Christianized by his time.
●For them—particularly those working in the Augustinian tradition—goodness and being were convertible. A thing was good in so far as it has being. This is the metaphysical undergirding of Augustine’s concept of evil as a privation. As a thing is deprived of existence it is a lesser good. Consequently, it is a greater good to come into existence and continue to exist than it is to come into existence and cease. And so forth. This does not negate the point that you make that a particular thing may be as “good as it gets.” In other words, a thing has its due “form.” However, even within species, it was noted that some things do not have their “due” form—they are defective. Today we may term these birth defects. So, it is a lesser good to be born blind than to have sight in one’s eyes. Blindness may be a good as it gets for the particular individual; but, it would have been better for them to have sight.

●Hey, John, you’ve got to give me “props” : - ) for at least launching into a defense of Anselm. You got to admit that it’s a pretty bold challenge in this day and age.

So we must ask, does the existence of a perfect rose follow immediately after the notion of a perfect rose?...It is believed that it was this question that Guanilo was getting at.

●Agreed, this is what Guanilo was getting at. Anselm’s reply was that Guanilo did not understand the difference between a “perfect” island and a being “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.”

Any notoriety he may have achieved has to come from him mindless definition of God. The more obscure, the more profound.

●Hmmm…Frankie, I think you need to bone-up on your British history. Anselm is one of the most important historical and political figures during a formative time in English history. You can find out more here:

http://salempress.com/store/samples/world_philosophers/world_philosophers_anselm.htm

You wrote: Aside from God, give me an example of the greatest thing you could conceive of, that than which God is greater. the Empire State Bldg?

●Obviously, you don’t think Anselm’s argument is worth taking seriously. May I suggest this is because you do not have a clue as to what he meant. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy takes the argument quite seriously. You can find their article on Anselm’s insights here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/

In other words, for a theist, the argument is persuasive but to a non-theist, the underlying premises cannot be accepted and the argument therefore fails. So, one could argue that ontological arguments are not dialectically efficacious — i.e., they give reasonable non-theists no reason to change their views and so they have no purpose.

●Timbo, I like your summary of the Stanford argument. I agree that it would be highly unlikely that a reasonable non-theist would be persuaded by Anselm’s argument. However, I don’t think Anselm was intending for his argument to be a “proof for God’s existence” as we think of it today. Let me, though; explain why I agree that the argument is unpersuasive.
●I’ve only studied the argument with theists. The interesting thing, though, is that probably most of us were pretty dismissive of the argument based on the fact we had only heard about it from second hand sources (e.g. teachers, professors, etc.) who pooh-poohed it. When we began to seriously study the argument and wrestle through to the point of actually understanding it the way Anselm meant it, then we had a completely different reaction. I felt myself suddenly caught in a mental trap set by Anselm. I found myself thinking, “Yeow, he’s got me!” I then immediately wanted to find a way out of the trap. And I’m a dedicated theist!!!
●You wrote in summary, “Anselm's ontological argument is true insofar as one cannot reject the conclusions while accepting the premises.” This is what people fail to understand. It is like the mouse that eats the cheese. As soon as he takes a bite out of the cheese, he’s trapped. Therefore, the only thing left to do is avoid the cheese.
●Now, let’s go back to the purpose of Anselm’s argument. I think his primary purpose was to establish a single definition of God by which the theist could then explore God’s divine attributes. Additionally, he was setting out to prove that the Psalmist’s “fool” was truly being foolish by being logically contradictory. On these two goals I think Anselm was successful. On the other hand, I doubt that anyone has ever been persuaded of God’s existence because of the ontological argument.

Just wanted you to know that I entered your litttle town only to find the road signs incomprehensible, I am now attempting to retrace my steps out.

●Okay, Gecko, I’m actually sympathetic with your concern here. This particular post is certainly not in the category of “theology for dummies.” Anselm’s argument—while seemingly simple—takes mental rigor to understand and I doubt that most people reading TFD want to sit and ponder it long enough to figure out what Anselm was getting at. It’s like watching a tough and complicated chess match. And that’s certainly not something everyone enjoys doing. I understand what you’re getting at.
●The reason I wrote the post was to take on the challenge laid down by John that I write something that disputes Aquinas. To do so, one has to head off into deep waters. I know you are not a fan of Aquinas; however, remember that their culture was steeped in intellectual disputation. If Christians were doing the kinds of public disputations that they were engaged in; most Christians would be absolutely “freaked out.” What came of their disputations, however, continues to intellectually and spiritually engage people 700 years afterward. There is something to be said for this.

I think that where Aquinas could be said to differ with Anselm is in that Aquinas did not think that reason alone could reveal God's nature. Aquinas agreed more with Denys that God's real nature was inaccessible to the human mind: "Hence in the last resort all that man knows of God is to know that he does not know him, since he knows that what God is surpasses all that we can understand of him." De Potentia q.7,a.5.ad.14

●When you refer to Denys, I take it that you are identifying Pseudo-Denys, the anonymous theologian and philosopher of the late 5th to early 6th century. My understanding of Denys is that his writings were used in the medieval era as the standard-bearer for mystical theology. The following passage from Denys gives a sense of this mysticism which, I think, would not be fully agreed to by Aquinas:

We say, therefore, that the universal Cause, which transcends the entire universe, is neither matter...nor has a body. It has neither figure nor form nor quality nor mass. It is in no particular place and cannot be grasped by the senses...Climbing yet higher, we now say that this Cause has neither soul nor intelligence;...that one can neither express it nor conceive of it; that it has neither number, nor order, nor greatness nor smallness, neither equality nor inequality, neither similarity nor dissimilarity. It neither remains still nor moves...It has neither power nor light. It is neither living nor not living. It is neither essence, perpetuity, nor time. One cannot grasp it intellectually. it is not knowledge, truth, kingship, wisdome, one, unity, divinity or good. It is not spirit or sonship or paternity in a way we can understand. Nor is it anything which is accessible to our knowledge or to the knowledge of any other being; nor has it anything that pertains to being. Nor one knows it as it is...It escapes our power to reason, name and know. It is neither dark nor light, neither true nor false. One can affirm or deny nothing of it. When we make affirmations and denials that relate to inferior things, we affirm or deny nothing of this Cause. For every affirmation remains on this side of its transcendence, which is deprived of everything and is beyond everything. (The Mystical Theology, IV-V)

●I don’t think Aquinas would sign-on to this cloud of unknowing.
●In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas distinguished between what he called the “preambles of faith,” which can be ascertained by philosophical principles, and the “articles of faith” that only by divine revelation. Aquinas’ own proofs for God’s existence are examples of preambles to faith.

1. It is possible to think of something that now exists as not existing. (In other words, things that we see around us have a contingent existence; there was a time when my computer did not exist.)

2. Generally speaking if a given locution is meaningful, its antonym will also be meaningful. Since (1) indicates that the term "contingent" is meaningful, its polar term "necessary" is also meaningful.

3. God is that than which a greater cannot be thought.

4. Something can be though of as existing which cannot be thought of as not existing.

5. This is greater than something that can be thought of as not existing.

6. By (4) and (5): if that than which a greaer cannot be thought can be thought of as not existing, this very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is not that which a greater cannot be thought.

7. But (6) is contradictory.

8. Therefore there exists a being that cannot be thought of as not existing, and this is God.

I have never been much attracted by the ontological proof because I doubt our ability to jump from logic to facts about the world…If the ontological proof really is logically valid as a number of modern philosophers say, then perhaps what the ontological proof is really saying is that if you buy into logic, you necessarily buy into the principle that God is present in - and is the final, material, formal and efficient cause of - logic.

●It was also Aquinas’ objection to the ontological argument that one cannot jump from logic to facts about the world. In the broadest sense, Anselm’s argument is more Platonic and Aquinas was Aristotelian. Anselm was demonstrating that if a thing is true at the intelligible level, it must also be true in the material world. In his proofs, Aquinas began with the “real” world and moved upward toward God. However, I really like your analysis that “if you buy into logic, you necessarily buy into the principle that God is present in” it.
●In my view, the whole thing is a fascinating piece Western of intellectual history. Anselm was a really bright guy who possessed incredible intellectual boldness.

You wrote: That's a fine point, but ultimately, I think, it is a defeat for atheists and materialists who want to argue that human reason can know everything. It seems like a bit of special pleading.

●Ah…I love this. I think this is exactly what Anselm set out to prove with the Psalmist’s “fool.” I also think that this is where Aquinas misunderstood Anselm. I doubt that Anselm believed his argument would drive materialists to their knees to call out for God’s mercy. Rather, I think he set out to stick them on the horns of a logical dilemma and make them look foolish. He’s obviously had centuries full of fun.

Denys (and Aquinas I think) would agree with Basil and Philo who made a distinction between God's essence (ousia) and his activities (energeiai). Basil said, "We know God only by his operations (energeiai) but we do not undertake to approach his essence." Basil, Epistle 234.1.

●I think you are right that Aquinas would agree with Basil’s statement. The problem I have with—I’ll term it—the Ineffable View of God is that it can quickly become the scalpel that severs the umbilical cord between faith and reason. In different eras of church history the pendulum swings back and forth between an emphasis on faith and/or reason. The Ineffable View at times becomes a proper corrective to an overemphasis on reason. However, I believe that this is an era that needs to reassert the reasonableness of Christianity.

You wrote: Interestingly, modern cosmologists have a form of Platonism whereby our three dimensional world is a projection from a multidimensional reality. So, maybe Anselm might be proven right after all.

●Ah…this is why I think it is unwise to dismiss the old guys out of hand. My personal view is that there is probably substantial truth in both Platonism and Aristotelian-ism. But, the really important thing is that these old guys worked out these things through intensive thinking sharpened by dialectic.
●By the way, I am now running two study-groups working through Prof. Thomas Williams’ “Faith and Reason: Philosophy in the Middle Ages.” Usually the first reaction I get when inviting a person to one of the groups is a jaw-dropping reaction of incomprehension. However, after a few weeks, it is not unusual for me to get an email or phone call from the same person excitedly expressing their amazement at how relevant and helpful are the studies.

I think a more convincing argument can be drawn from what I've pointed out to Gecko on numerous occasions, namely that all things that exist relate to each other at all levels demanding a single unifying thing far greater than all that does this. It's the stage upon which creation exists. In fact, creation takes its existence from this "stage".

●You might find this interesting…

(ST I, Q. 44, A. 1) Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.

Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth;

You wrote: This thing/being must possess at least every attribute found in creation and possess it in such a way and to such an extent so as to allow all to flow from it.

●This, also, you may find interesting...

(ST I, Q. 44, A. 3)

On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.

I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (15, 1). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.

This I have not seen, in particular from you to me. Nevertheless, had you "pointed out" this to me it would not be a matter of correction. With the LDS you preach to the choir, except of course where you apply the meanings that Plato and Aristotle apply to "nature"...you and Aquinas incorporating them into what was the less corrupted Christianity.

●John wrote this to you in relationship to the LDS belief in eternal matter. He pointed out to you that if there is something outside of God that He has not created that He only makes or “organizes” into things, or if there are “intelligences” that are co-eternal and “co-equal” to Him then He, obviously, is not the creator of all things. Therefore, the LDS does not believe that God is the exemplar of all things and that all things proceed from Him as created beings. This is just another example of Mormon confusion. Mormons claim on the one hand that God is the creator of all things and then turn right around and claim that there is a thing called “eternal matter” that He has not created and that humans are “intelligences” that are “co-equal” with God. These notions cannot be reconciled. Because these notions contradict each other, Mormonism cannot be true because the truth does not contradict itself.

I can think of a mobius strip all day long. I can even draw one, but it is physically impossible.

●What Anselm meant by “impossible things cannot be thought” is a little different than what you have understood it to be. It does not mean, for instance, that one cannot think of a unicorn. Though unicorns do not exist in reality, I can think of a horse and a horn and stick the two together in my mind and “presto” I have thought of a unicorn.

What Anselm meant is that essential impossibilities cannot be thought. For instance; a square circle is an essential impossibility. The terms “square circle” negate one another. Essential impossibilities are those things that negate (or attempt to negate) the law of non-contradiction. Another example would be a non-rational human. The term “rational” defines what a human is. A person can say they are thinking about a square circle, but in reality it is impossible to conceive of such a thing. Consequently, it is impossible to conceive of a being “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” that does not exist. The second I say, “I have conceived of a being that is greater than any other being, but, it doesn’t exist,” then I have not conceived of such a being.

You wrote: I personally believe that experiencing God is a much more compelling argument for the existence of God than the argument as presented by Anselem.

●This may be because you haven’t given Anselm’s argument its full weight. Anselm’s argument—for those who take it seriously and are willing to do the mental work to understand it—find that it is not easily dismissed. At least part of Anselm’s purpose was to force the scoffing non-believer to “experience” the foolishness of having to contradict himself in order to dismiss God. I think many people have found that Anselm’s argument forces the scoffing non-believer to embrace irrationality (his own foolishness). This is an experience that is just.
●As you know, people can have all kinds of elevated and ecstatic religious experiences. The ancient world in which Paul presented the gospel was full of the “bells and smells” of religious experience. This is why he insisted that Christianity is rooted in the truth and apprehended by the person’s mind that has been illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

●Simply put, Anselm was working within the Western philosophical tradition which holds that rational thought is not possible when violating the law of non-contradiction ("one cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time"—Aristotle). Obviously, a person could say “I am saying of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time…phooey on you, Aristotle!” However, they would only be showing themselves to be foolish, absurd and putting an end to all rational discourse. Again, Anselm would not question for a second that a person can think they are thinking of a plethora of supreme beings. However, such a concept is impossible because the terms negate one another. I personally like what the great Muslim philosopher Avicenna had to say about this subject:

"Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned." Muslims know how to end the philosophical baloney.

●The word that should be added to make full sense of Aristotle’s principle is the word “truly.” Here is Aristotle from Metaphysics.

If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in a particular relation and one without qualification.

●Square circles are contraries as are multiple-supreme-beings as is a non-existing GCB.

●“Opposite assertions cannot be true at the same time.” Metaphysics IV. Consequently, the statement, “I am thinking of a being that is the GCB who is non-existent,” is to make an opposing assertion. It “truly” is impossible.

http://www.elite.net/~ebedyah/PastorsSite/otherareas/kantdiscussion.htm

What they fail to mention is that the word "are" is a synonym for "exists." In other words 1a. is really saying If there exist any dogs, they bark. Now it is apparent the fallacy of this position. For statements 1a. and 1b. contain two predicates (exist and bark) whereas 2a. and 2b. contain only one predicate (exist) which accounts for the difference in the two statements. If we would make 1a. and 1b. with only one predicate to have a fair comparison with 2a. and 2b. we would get 1a. If there bark any dogs, they bark, and 1b. There bark dogs, and they bark. Now 1a. and 1b. are just as suspect as 2a. and 2b. Obviously all four statements need more information. Here are my proposed readings: 1a. If people hear barking, then dogs exist, and 1b. People do hear barking, therefore dogs exist, compared with 2a. If people feel a divine presence, then God exists, and 2b. People do feel a divine presence, therefore God exists. Don’t expect to find these examples in any philosophy textbook soon.

The Trinity is an assumed contradiction given it is an admitted mystery to explain.

●No, the Trinity is not an “assumed contradiction.” Your view of the Trinity is a confusion of categories. The Trinity is One God in three Divine Persons. Persons and substance are two separate theological categories. However, please allow me to show you a true contradiction. A true contradiction is the Mormon notion of the belief in one God in three individual and separate divine “personages.” The LDS claims to be monotheistic while at the same time claiming that they believe in (at minimum) three separate and individual personages. Of course, we all know that Mormons also believe in a “Mother” goddess as well. The point is that this is a clear contradiction in terms. The LDS cannot be monotheistic and claim to believe in one God while also believing in three gods with one goddess. The normal term for this is polytheism.
●All this is just one more example of Mormon theological incoherency and self-defeating and competing doctrines. Again, the problem is that Joseph Smith started developing his religion using orthodox Christian categories and then attempted to weld a mishmash of oddball religious ideas on to them. The result is a blended concoction of conflicting doctrines that clearly do not agree. It takes a mammoth effort of self-delusion to fail to see this.

A beginningless series of events in time is an actual infinite. In other words, if the series of past events had no beginning, it is actually infinite. If premise one is correct, however, it follows that a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist. Consider the following example. The Battle of Hastings took place in 1066. The Declaration of Independence was adopted in 1776, 710 years after the Battle of Hastings. If the series of past events in the universe is actually infinite, we can say that the Battle of Hastings was preceded by an infinite number of events. We can say the same about the Declaration of Independence. In fact we can say that the set of past events before the Battle of Hastings is equal to the set of past events before the Declaration of Independence, because part of an actually infinite set is equal to the whole set, as noted above. But how can that be? 710 years separate these two events, i.e., 710 years were added to the set of past events before the Battle of Hastings to get to the Declaration of Independence. By definition, however, nothing can be added to an actual infinite. Hence the series of past events before the Battle of Hastings cannot be actually infinite. Craig thus draws the conclusion to the first philosophical argument as follows: "[s]o the series of all past events must be finite and have a beginning. But the universe is the series of all events, so the universe must have had a beginning" (Craig, The Existence of God, 47).

The problem I have is not one of my personal ability to comprehend God, but rather an issue of sharing the gospel. Certainly there will be people who are helped with the ontological argument, but I think, as you have pointed out, that most of my generation and of the ones to follow me will be most able to relate to an experience rather than a theoretical application of logic that may or may not be valid in a day and age when truth is becoming more and more relative.

●Okay, we are getting into personal experience and opinion here, and that is good because I have my own view on the generational aspect of sharing the faith.
●Recently when we had Dinesh D’Souza (author of What’s So Great About Christianity) in our area for a public debate with Michael Shermer the head of Skeptic Magazine (the debate was at Fresno State), D’Souza was asked about postmodernism and Christianity. His paraphrased answer was, “Ignore it.” What he went on to say is what I have long suspected. Remember D’Souza actually debates leading skeptics, postmodernists and atheists on college campuses and deals with thousands of next-generation students. I wrote a post on his fuller answer. He went on to say that there are really no postmodernists. No one lives by a postmodernist philosophy. Just below the surface of a postmodernist is an absolutist waiting to superimpose their absolutism on everyone else. The question is, “Whose absolutism will dominate.” D’Souza, of course, is in favor of Christian absolutism because it provides the maximum amount of individual freedom for a just society. However, he believes (and I agree) that postmodernist will not allow the same kind of commonweal freedoms that Christianity fosters. D’Souza noted--again, remember he has vast experience in this area--that with a little “push-back” at a postmodernist, their absolutism will magically appear with a vengeance.
●By way of providing two anecdotal examples let me share a couple of experiences. At the debate we provided a lengthy period of Q and A. It is amazing how many of the “opposition” questions were strongly worded absolutist statements. In fact, one of the big complaints of those opposing theism was that D’Souza used “too many metaphors.” What they were referring to was D’Souza’s ability to defend theism with logic and then illustrate his point with a simple-to-grasp illustration. It seemed comical to me that people who yammer on about deconstructionism and the need for personal narratives could get so overwrought with a capable Christian using illustrations to clarify abstractions.
●I have also discovered that there is a thirst among bright high school and college students for rigorous philosophical and theological discussion. This post was born out of two study-groups I do that include high school and college students. Our basic material is hardcore theology/philosophy covering a 1,000 year period of medieval history. I believe that if I had enough time in my schedule, I could run as many of these groups as I wanted for high school and college students. In fact, as an age-category, I find them far more interested in these things than older people.

You suffer from Orwell's "doublethink". You could have terribly consistant foundational principles, the easiest place to avoid visible contradiction, and then cannot avoid revealing contradiction (by painting yourself into a corner) in your "practical application"…etc., etc., etc., yada, yada, yada…

●Okay, let’s simplify things. Any definition of the Trinity that violates the Nicene Creed is false, period. Second, the Nicene Creed is not a logical contradiction like the LDS theology of its “Godhead.” Furthermore, any so-called Christian explanation or definition of the Trinity that violates the Nicene Creed cannot be deemed truly Christian. In fact it is “anathema.” Therefore, from a Christian perspective, the LDS notion of the “Godhead” is anathema. Based on this, I double-dare you to provide any two Christian definitions of the Trinity that are logical contradictions. As my momma used to say, “Put up, or shut up.”

●No, that is absolutely NOT what I meant. This is what I wrote: “I double-dare you to provide any two Christian definitions of the Trinity that are logical contradictions. As my momma used to say, ‘Put up, or shut up.’”
●As usual, you yammer on about all of the various contradictory definitions of the Trinity within orthodox Christianity and when asked to provide even one example, you cannot.

You wrote: The creed cannot be tested internally. By definition, it has NO "internal integrity", whereas the Bible has significant internal integrity. The contradictions of the Trinity are all external to the Nicene Creed.

●What in the world does this mean? The point has to do with self-defeating or contradictory notions. The LDS doctrines of “three divine personages” and the belief in one God are contradictory. The orthodox notions of the Nicene Creed stated as follows are not contradictory:

We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ,
the only Son of God,
eternally begotten of the Father,
God from God, light from light,
true God from true God,
begotten, not made,
of one Being with the Father;

●Your idea of the “contradictions of the Trinity are all external to the Nicene Creed” is a meaningless. What is it supposed to be contradicting? Oh, I get it; the Nicene Creed contradicts LDS theology! Okay, yeah, I agree.

●The good news is that the Nicene Creed—has you have aptly noted—does not have any internal logical contradictions. It is also good news to note that the Nicene Creed contradicts external things like LDS doctrine. Here we are happily agreed. The bad news is that LDS doctrine of the Godhead is both internally contradictory and it also contradicts the Nicene Creed. It seems like we are finally on the same page.